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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
EDWARD DOVELL SPINKS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20010985-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for murder, a first degree felony. This Court 
has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to the pour-over provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)G) (Supp. 2001). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Has defendant established reversible error based on prosecutorial 
misconduct where he has not shown misconduct, let alone that such 
misconduct was prejudicial? 
Only two of defendant's prosecutorial misconduct claims were preserved below. 
Those claims are reviewed for abuse of discretion, giving deference to the trial court 
"because of the advantaged position of the trial judge to determine the impact of events 
occurring in the courtroom on the total proceedings/' State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, 
% 46,27 P.3d 1133 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Defendant's remaining claims, if reviewed at all, are reviewed for plain error. 
State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348,113, 57 P3d 1139 (holding unpreserved claims are 
reviewed for plain error). To establish plain error, defendant must show (1) that an error 
occurred; (2) that the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) that the 
error was harmful, i.e., that the results of defendant's trial would have probably been 
more favorable to him absent the error. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208-09 (Utah 
1993). 
II. Does defendant's confrontation clause claim fail where he affirmatively 
sanctioned the admission of the statements he now challenges? 
Because defendant did not raise this claim below, it is reviewable, if at all, only for 
plain error. State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, \ 13,57 P.3d 1139. However, the plain 
error doctrine "is in no way implicated if defense counsel consciously elects to permit 
evidence to be admitted." State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Kingston, 2002 UT App 103,122, 46 P.3d 761. 
HI. Was defense counsel constitutionally ineffective in failing to object to 
out-of-court statements offered merely to explain the course of 
Detective Lucas's investigation, in failing to object to allegedly 
improper character evidence, and in failing to produce Sheldon Reeves 
as a defense witness? 
Issues of counsel ineffectiveness, when raised for the first time on appeal, are 
questions of law, reviewed for correctness. State v. Silva, 2000 UT App 292, % 12,13 
P.3d 604. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
United States Const, amend. VI {see Addendum); 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 12 {see Addendum). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 23,2000, defendant was charged with one count of murder, a first degree 
felony, for the death of Tonya Stevens (R. 1). After a jury trial, defendant was found 
guilty as charged (R. 260). Defendant was sentenced to five-years-to-life in prison, to run 
consecutively to the prison sentence defendant was then serving (R. 269-271). Defendant 
timely appealed (R. 272-73). 
Defendant's original appellate counsel filed an Anders brief. After this Court 
struck that brief as inadequate, current counsel was appointed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At approximately midnight on May 19,2000, defendant stabbed Tonya Stevens 
sixty-nine times in her apartment, slicing both her jugular veins and her aorta (R. 283:46, 
52-81). Tonya was stabbed "pretty much all over, even in the face, the neck and she had 
a pretty good gash on her left leg thigh area" (R. 281:26,178). She had defensive 
wounds on her arms and hands (R. 281:28). 
Tonya's body was found on her bedroom floor, toward the back of her apartment 
(R. 281:21-22). Her blood was found on the inside doorknob of the front door, on a chair 
in the living room, on her bedroom door, and "pretty much everywhere" in her bedroom 
(R. 281:21-22; R. 282:136, 138, 223). The blood patterns suggested that Tonya was first 
stabbed near the living room chair and that the murderer then followed her as she tried to 
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retreat to her bedroom (R. 282:207-08, 210, 218). Defendant's fingerprint was found on 
the inside door knob of Tonya's apartment door; the orientation of the print suggested that 
defendant had his back to the door at the time and had used his finger 1o shut it (R. 
282:89, 93, 200). Defendant's palm print was found in the blood that covered Tonya's 
bed rail near her body (R. 282:90,94, 184). 
A neighbor of Tonya's had seen defendant smoking a cigarette outside the 
apartment building at about 11:20 p.m. (R. 281:20, 73,198). A few minutes later, 
defendant called Darinda Blakenship from Tonya's apartment (R. 281:54, 56, 75). At 
11:48 p.m., Tonya received a telephone call from a friend inviting her out (R. 281:152-
53). When the friend arrived to pick her up at 12:20 a.m., Tonya was dead and her 
apartment ransacked (R. 281:23,25,129,160). About the same time, defendant called 
and asked a friend to pick him up on a viaduct a short distance from Tonya's home (R. 
282:9). 
Soon after discovering the murder, investigating officers noticed the body of a 
pickup truck a short distance from Tonya's apartment in an alley behind the house where 
defendant lived (R. 281:43-44,218). Under the wheel well on one side of the truck, the 
officers found a baseball cap, a T-shirt, a pair of boxer shorts, and a pair of denim pants, 
all with human blood on them (R. 281:43,47,219,222; R. 282:124,175). Subsequent 
lab analysis of the pants confirmed the blood was Tonya's (R. 282:139). 
On the other side of the truck, the officers found some of Tonya's clothing, her 
purse and identification, some hair spray, and other belongings (R. 281:49, 50, 225). 
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On May 22, defendant met with Officer Dave Lucas (R. 281:61-62). When 
defendant arrived at the station, he was given his Miranda rights (R. 281:64). Defendant 
indicated he understood those rights and was willing to talk (R. 281:65). 
After initially implicating another person in Tonya's murder, defendant confessed 
to stabbing her (R. 281:100,108,116-17). Defendant stated that he had been in Tonya's 
apartment for about twenty-five minutes chitchatting (R. 281:111). When he tried to 
leave the apartment, Tonya—for some unknown reason—approached him with a knife 
(R. 281:116,124). Defendant grabbed the knife from her (R.281:116). Although now 
safe from any threat, defendant "lost all self-control" and stabbed Tonya (R. 281:116-17). 
He remembered stabbing Tonya about five times before he blacked out (R. 281:110,117). 
When he came to, Tonya had been butchered (R. 281:116). Defendant then "took off 
[his] clothes and hid them under the truck, the truck bed," and "hid her purse on the other 
side of the truck bed" (R. 281:110). After taking a shower, he called his friend Joyce 
Nevaraz to pick him up on the viaduct (R. 281:110). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue I. Defendant claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his 
opening comment by referring to statements made by people who were not called as 
witnesses. Because defendant did not raise this claim below and argues neither plain 
error nor exceptional circumstances, this Court should refuse to reach his claim. In any 
case, because the statements made by those people were presented through Officer 
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Lucas's testimony at trial, the prosecutor did nothing improper in referencing that 
evidence during his opening comment. 
Defendant also claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct by objecting in 
front of the jury that one of defense counsel's questions in cross-examination was 
misleading. Defendant cites no Utah case law holding that such an objection is improper. 
Moreover, where, in the jury's presence, the trial court twice agreed with defense counsel 
that the prosecutor's conduct was improper, defendant cannot show he was harmed by the 
error, even if one did occur. 
Defendant next claims that the prosecutor improperly asked a witness, the victim's 
friend, whether she was "scared to death to be here." Because defendlant did not raise this 
claim below and argues neither plain error nor exceptional circumstances, this Court 
should refuse to reach his claim. Moreover, defendant cites no legal authority to support 
his claim. Thus, defendant's claim is inadequately briefed. 
Defendant's fourth claim is that the prosecutor improperly elicited prior bad acts 
evidence when he allowed Detective Shane Minor to testify that he and defendant knew 
each other from a prior, unrelated introduction. Because defendant provides no legal 
authority to support his claim that such testimony is prior bad acts evidence, he has not 
shown error, let alone obvious error. 
Defendant's fifth claim is that the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of 
proof during his rebuttal closing argument. Because the prosecutor was merely 
responding to arguments made during defendant's closing argument, the prosecutor's 
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comments were not improper. Even if they were, the trial court mitigated any prejudice 
by sustaining defendant's objections and properly instructing the jury on the burden of 
proof. 
Defendant's final prosecutorial misconduct claim is that the prosecutor improperly 
referred to the trial court when discussing the application of the reasonable doubt jury 
instruction to a theory raised during defendant's closing argument. Because defendant 
did not raise this claim below and argues neither plain error nor exceptional 
circumstances, this Court should refuse to reach his claim. In any case, because 
defendant provides no legal authority to support his claim, he does not establish error, let 
alone obvious error. 
Issue IL Defendant claims his state and federal constitutional rights to 
confrontation were violated because Officer Lucas testified as to statements made to him 
by people who were not called as witnesses at trial. Defense counsel expressly told the 
trial court that such evidence was admissible. Thus, any error in their admission was 
invited. Alternatively, defendant's claim fails because out-of-court statements not offered 
for the truth of the matters asserted do not implicate defendant's confrontation rights. 
Finally, defendant's claim fails because he cannot show prejudice from Officer Lucas's 
testimony where, given the fingerprint and palm print evidence and defendant's 
confession, the evidence against him was compelling. 
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Issue III. Defendant claims his counsel was ineffective because he (1) failed to 
object to the admission of out-of-court statements, (2) failed to object to the prosecutor's 
alleged misconduct, and (3) failed to call Sheldon Reeves as a defense witness. 
Defendant's first two claims are based on the arguments he raises in Points I and II 
of his brief. Because defendant has not shown error, let alone prejudicial error, in those 
Points, his ineffective assistance claims based on them fails. 
Defendant's last claim fails because he does not provide this Court with a record to 
support it. Specifically, defendant has not explained what testimony Sheldon Reeves 
would have given or how his testimony would have helped the defense. Thus, defendant 
has not shown that his trial counsel was ineffective in not calling Reeves as a witness. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
BASED ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT WHERE; HE HAS 
NOT SHOWN MISCONDUCT, LET ALONE THAT SUCH 
MISCONDUCT WAS PREJUDICIAL 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct by making "several 
statements [at trial] that were improper." Aplt. Br. at 14. Specifically, defendant claims 
that the prosecutor improperly (1) referred to evidence in his opening statement that was 
not presented at trial; (2) objected to a question by defense counsel in cross-examination 
as misleading; (3) asked a witness whether she was scared to be testifying; (4) allowed a 
police officer to testify that he and defendant had been introduced on a prior, unrelated 
occasion; (5) shifted the burden of proof during rebuttal closing argument by responding 
to arguments raised by defendant in his closing argument; and (6) referred to the trial 
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court when explaining the reasonable doubt jury instruction during rebuttal closing 
argument. Aplt. Br. at 13-26. Each of defendant's claims fail. 
To establish prosecutorial misconduct, "'defendant must show that the 
[prosecutor's] remarks called to the jurors' attention matters which they would not be 
justified in considering in reaching a verdict and, if so, that the remarks were harmful.'" 
State v. Tuckett, 2000 UT App 295, H 14, 13 P.3d 1060 (quoting State v. Bakalov, 1999 
UT 45,1 56, 979 P.2d 799) (additional citations omitted). 
A. Defendant's unpreserved claim that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct during opening argument fails where he argues 
neither plain error nor exceptional circumstances on appeal; 
alternatively, the claim fails on its merits. 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct during opening 
argument by "referring] to the statements of witnesses who did not testify at the trial." 
Aplt. Br. at 14. Defendant claims these statements "were very prejudicial" because 
clothing was found with the victim's blood on it and "[t]he prosecutor told the jury that 
two separate witnesses identified some of the clothing as the Defendant's." Aplt. Br. at 
15. Defendant has waived this claim by not preserving it below and not arguing plain 
error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. Alternatively, defendant's claim fails on 
the merits. 
1. This Court should not reach defendant's unpreserved 
claim where he does not argue either plain error or 
exceptional circumstances on appeal. 
The general rule in criminal cases is that "'a contemporaneous objection or some 
form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court 
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record before an appellate court will review such claims on appeal.'" State v. Johnson, 
774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 
1987)); see also State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,111,10 P.3d 346. 
This preservation rule "applies to every claim . . . unless a defendant can 
demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." Holgate, 
2000 UT 74, at fflf 11,14. Where defendant "does not argue that 'exceptional 
circumstances' or 'plain error' justifies a review of the issue, [this Court will] decline to 
consider it on appeal." State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (citation 
omitted); see also State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 570 (Utah App. 1994). 
To preserve this claim below, defendant would have had to object when the State 
did not called Daniel or Leota as witnesses in its case-in-chief. Defendant did not do so. 
Moreover, he does not argue plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. See 
Aplt. Br. at 14-17. Consequently, this Court should decline to consider this claim. 
2. Defendant's claim fails on the merits. 
Because defendant did not preserve his claim below, it is reviewable, if at all, only 
for plain error. State v. Bradley, 2002 Ut App 348, J 13, 57 P.3d 1139. To establish plain 
error, defendant must show (1) that an error occurred; (2) that the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court; and (3) that the error was harmful, i.e., that the results of 
defendant's trial would have probably been more favorable to him absent the error. State 
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
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Here, defendant claims that, in his opening comments, the prosecutor improperly 
referred to statements made by Daniel Moore and Leota Ray to Officer Dave Lucas 
because neither Daniel nor Leota testified at trial. Aplt. Br. at 14. However, defendant 
cannot establish error, let alone obvious and prejudicial error, because the evidence 
alluded to in the prosecutor's opening statement was in fact admitted at trial during 
Officer Lucas's testimony (R. 281:47, 56-58). Moreover, defense counsel agreed that 
such evidence was admissible during Lucas's testimony because it was "not being offered 
for the truth of the matter asserted, simply to explain what Officer Lucas did and why he 
did it" (R. 281:15,223; R. 283:220). Thus, the prosecutor did not refer to anything not 
ultimately placed before the jury.1 
In any event, defendant cannot show he was prejudiced by the prosecutor's 
comments. See State v. Tuckett, 20002 UT App 295, f 14,13 P.3d 1060 (holding 
defendant must show prosecutor's remarks were harmful). First, defendant confessed to 
murdering Tonya and then hiding his bloody clothes under the truck bed (R. 281:110, 
116-17). In addition, defendant's fingerprint was found on the inside part of Tonya's 
door and his palm print was found imprinted on Tonya's bloody bed rail (R. 282:89,90, 
93, 94,184,200). Given this evidence, defendant cannot show that, absent the 
prosecutor's remarks, "the results of defendant's trial would have probably been more 
*Lucas, the lead investigator in this case, testified that he showed the bloody 
clothing to Daniel, a boy who lived in the house behind where the truck bed was found, to 
Darinda Blackenship, and to Loeta (Joletta) Ray (R. 281:47, 56-58). Daniel and Darinda 
identified the baseball cap as defendant's; Loeta Ray identified the pants and underwear 
as defendant's (R. 281:47, 56-58). 
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favorable to him." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 (Utah 1993) (explaining what 
defendant must show to establish harmful error). 
Consequently, defendant's claim fails. 
B. Defendant's claim that the prosecutor improperly objected to a 
defense question as misleading fails because he has not shown 
that the objection was either improper or unfairly prejudicial. 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct when, in the jury's 
presence, he objected to a question asked by defense counsel during cross-examination as 
misleading. Aplt. Br. at 17. Defendant claims the prosecutor's objection was an 
improper "attack [on] the character of [his] attorney in front of the jury." Aplt. Br. at 17. 
According to defendant, **the trial judge should have either granted a mistrial or 
reprimanded the prosecutor in the presence of the jury and given a curative instruction." 
Aplt. Br. at 19. 
*"A trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial will not be reversed absent an 
abuse of discretion.'" State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, % 46,27 P.3d 1133 (quoting State 
v. Wach, 2001 UT 35,145,24 P.3d 948). This Court "give[s] just deference to the trial 
court ruling 'because of the advantaged position of the trial judge to determine the impact 
of events occurring in the courtroom on the total proceedings.'" Id. (quoting State v. 
Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219,1231 (Utah 1997)). 
1. Proceedings below. 
On direct examination, Joyce Nevarez testified that she received a telephone call 
from defendant about midnight on the night of Tonya's murder asking that she pick him 
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up on the viaduct a short distance from Tonya's apartment (R.282:7-8, 11). Nevarez 
picked defendant up that night and brought him back to her house (R. 282:15,17). The 
next day, when defendant told her he was a suspect in a murder case, Nevarez encouraged 
defendant to contact the police (R. 282:24,27,32). However, before defendant met with 
police, he asked Nevarez to go to his sister's home and get him a different pair of 
sneakers (R. 282:28). Defendant then changed into the new pair of sneakers, black and 
white Filas, before going to the police station (R. 282:29,33-34). The sneakers defendant 
was wearing when Nevarez picked him up on the viaduct remained at her home (R. 
282:33-34). 
When Nevarez and defendant arrived at the police station, Nevarez was 
interviewed by Officer Doug Lucero (R. 282:33). During her interview, Nevarez stated 
that the sneakers defendant was then wearing were the same sneakers he wore when she 
picked him up on the viaduct (R. 282:41). Nevarez was subsequently interviewed again, 
this time with her attorney present (R. 282:5). In her second statement, Nevarez said that 
defendant was wearing a different pair of sneakers and that the ones he wore on the 
viaduct were at her home (R. 282:45). 
On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Nevarez regarding her two 
inconsistent statements (R. 282:45). At one point, counsel asked Nevarez whether, in her 
second statement, she told police that the shoes defendant wore the night of the murder 
were the ones he left at her home (R. 282:45). When Nevarez answered affirmatively, 
defense counsel, still appearing to refer to Nevarez's second statement, asked "But you 
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told the police that the shoes he was wearing on Friday night at the viaduct were black 
and white Filas" (R. 282:45. The following ensued: 
Prosecutor: Well, wait a minute. That's not what that question 
says in the example. 




— that is a misrepresentation. 
Now, wait. Now wait just a minute. 
Defense counsel: [The prosecutor] can make an objection, but he can't 
argue that in front of the jury. 
Court: I agree. 












I can make the objection that he's — 
Now, just—just a moment. 
— he's misleading what this says. 
[Prosecutor], please. 
I would ask your Honor to look at that question 
Now just a minute, please. 
— and see if this isn't misleading. 
All right. I'll be glad to do that — 
All right. 
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Court: — but it would be preferable not to argue those facts 
before the jury. 
What — What I would like to do is have you 
folks step out. We need to resolve a little problem here. 
(R. 282:45-46). 
Out of the jury's presence, the court ruled that the prosecutor's objection was "well 
taken" (R. 282:49). However, the court also agreed with defense counsel that the 
prosecutor's objection was "not an objection you make in front of the jury" (R. 282:51). 
Although the court denied defendant's motion for a mistrial, the court did warn counsel 
that "I'll have no further outbursts of this kind, especially before the jury" (R. 282:52). 
When the jury returned to the courtroom, the court stated, "You may proceed, [defense 
counsel]" (R. 282:52). 
2. Analysis. 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct in objecting, in the 
jury's presence, that a question by defense counsel was misleading. Aplt. Br. at 17. State 
v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262 (Utah 1998), the sole case on which defendant relies, does not 
support his claim. 
In Harmon, the supreme court reviewed six instances where the defendant claimed 
the prosecutor had improperly impugned defense counsel. Id. at 275-76. The court 
rejected the defendant's claim that any of the six instances, individually or collectively, 
required reversal. Harmon, 956 P.2d at 277; id. at 277 (Durham, J., joined by 
Zimmerman, C.J., concurring in result). 
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The Harmon court's consideration of the second instance is the most relevant here. 
In that instance, the prosecutor objected to defense counsel's questioning of a witness, 
claiming that counsel was substituting his words for those of the witness. Id. at 275. 
Defense counsel then argued, "c[W]hat he is doing . . . is claiming that I am somehow 
misleading this witness '" Id. The trial court concluded "that the jury could interpret 
the matter itself and directed questioning to continue." Id. Even though the trial court 
gave no curative instruction after the exchange, the supreme court found this instance 
"insignificant." Id. at 277. 
The same is true here. First, defendant has not established that the prosecutor's 
objection was in fact improper. See, e.g., Spear v. State, 513 S.E.2d 489,491-92 (Ga. 
1999) (finding no prosecutorial misconduct where prosecutor's objection to defense 
statements as misleading, although perhaps "stronger than appropriate," "was correct"). 
Second, defendant cannot show he was harmed by the prosecutor's objection, even 
if it were improper. Twice in the jury's presence, the trial court agreed with defense 
counsel that the prosecutor's objection was inappropriate (R. 282:46). Then, upon the 
jury's return, the court instructed defense counsel, "You may proceed, [defense counsel]" 
(R. 282:52), implicitly telling the jury that defense counsel's prior questioning was 
proper. Under such circumstances, the only impression the jury could have been left with 
was that the prosecutor, not defense counsel, had done anything improper. See Harmon, 
956 P.2d at 277 (noting, in discussing prejudice from prosecutor's comments against 
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defense counsel, that comments probably increased, not decreased, defense counsel's 
integrity with jury). 
Moreover, the evidence against defendant was compelling. Most importantly, 
defendant confessed to killing Tonya (R. 281:110,116-17). In addition, defendant's 
fingerprint was found on Tonya's inside door, his palm print was found on the bloody bed 
rail just above her body, and his bloody clothes were found hidden nearby (R. 281:110, 
116-17; R. 282:89,90,93,94,184,200). Given this evidence, defendant cannot show 
that, absent the prosecutor's objection, "the results of defendant's trial would have 
probably been more favorable to him." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1209 (Utah 1993). 
Consequently, defendant's claim fails. 
C. Defendant's unpreserved claim challenging allegedly "improper 
character evidence" fails where he argues neither plain error nor 
exceptional circumstances on appeal; alternatively, the claim 
fails because defendant provides no legal analysis to support it. 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he asked 
Elizabeth Stitt, the murder victim's friend, "Elizabeth, you are scared to death to be here, 
right?" Aplt. Br. at 19 (quoting R. 281:151). This Court should reject defendant's claim 
because he did not raise it below and argues neither plain error nor exceptional 
circumstances on appeal. In any case, because defendant provides no legal support for his 
claim, he has not shown error, let alone obvious and prejudicial error. 
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1. This Court should not reach defendant's unpreserved claim 
where he does not argue either plain error or exceptional 
circumstances on appeal. 
As discussed above, before this Court will consider a claim on appeal, defendant 
must either have preserved that claim below or must argue that plain error or exception 
circumstances justifies review of the claim. See State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1141,1144 
(Utah 1989); State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, flf 11,14,10 P.3d 346; see also State v. 
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995); State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 570 
(Utah App. 1994). 
Defendant did not raise this claim below. Moreover, he does not argue plain error 
or exceptional circumstances on appeal. See Aplt. Br. at 19. Consequently, this Court 
should decline to consider this claim. 
2. Defendant's claim fails because he provides no legal 
authority to support a plain error claim. 
Even if this Court considers defendant's unpreserved claim, it is reviewable only 
for plain error. State v. Bradley, 2002 Ut App 348,113, 57 P.3d 1139. "To show 
obviousness of the error, [defendant] must show that the law was clear at the time of 
trial." State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19,16,18 P.3d 1123. Defendant meets that burden 
only if he can cite to "settled appellate law to guide the trial court." State v. Ross, 951 
P.2d 236,239 (Utah App. 1997). 
Here, defendant's entire argument consists of the following paragraph: 
The prosecutor committed misconduct by referring to 
improper character evidence. When the State called Elizabeth Stitt 
to testify, the prosecutor asked her to state her name. After she 
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stated her name, the prosecutor stated 'Elizabeth, you are scared to 
death to be here, right?" R. 281/151. This statement by the 
prosecutor was clearly improper. It wasn't a question and it certainly 
wasn't relevant. Its only purpose was to prejudice the Defendant by 
showing that witnesses were afraid to testify against him. 
Aplt.Br. at 19. 
Because defendant cites no legal authority to support his claim, defendant has not 
established error, let alone obvious error. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, at <| 6; Ross, 951 
P.2d at 239. 
Moreover, defendant cannot show prejudice where the comment was isolated and 
the evidence against him—including his confession, the fingerprint and palm print 
evidence, and his bloody clothes—was compelling. See State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 
269 (Utah 1998) (finding isolated reference to defendant's invocation of right to remain 
silent harmless where prosecutor made no further reference thereto); State v. Thomas, 111 
?2d 445,448 (Utah 1989) (holding reference to defendant's race in closing argument 
was not prejudicial where "remark was an isolated incident and not part of 'continued 
efforts' to bias the jury"); see also State v. Helmick, 2000 UT 70,^ 9, 9 P.3d 164 (holding 
admission of evidence, even if erroneous, harmless where "there was overwhelming 
evidence of [defendant's] guilt"); State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 931 (Utah App. 
1998). 
Consequently, defendant's claim fails. 
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D. A police officer's brief testimony that defendant remembered 
him from a prior introduction was not prosecutorial misconduct 
where no evidence of defendant's prior bad acts was elicited. 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly "referred to prior bad acts of the 
Defendant" by letting Detective Shane Minor testify that he had met defendant prior to , 
this case. Aplt. Br. at 19. Defendant's claim fails because he has not shown that such 
testimony constitutes prior bad acts evidence that was obviously inadmissible under rule 
404(b). 
1. Proceedings below. 
Detective Shane Minor, the last witness called in the State's case-in-chief, was one 
of the two officers who interviewed defendant on May 22,2000 (R. 283:100). Minor 
testified that he began speaking with defendant just after noon (R. 283:101). The 
following exchange took place: 
Prosecutor: Did you introduce yourself to him? 
Witness: I identified myself. Asked Mr. Spinks if he'd 
remembered me. 
Prosecutor: Well, and you had known him for some unrelated reason. 
Witness: Yes, from the past, and he acknowledged that. 
Prosecutor: Yeah, this has nothing to do with what we're talking 
about here? 
Witness: No, just an introduction. 
Prosecutor: Okay. After you—was it a pleasant introduction that 
you had with him? 
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Witness: Yeah, just asked him if he remembered me, and he 
acknowledged he did. 
(R. 283:101-02). 
2. Analysis. 
Because defendant did not raise this claim below, this Court reviews it only for 
plain error. See State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, K 13, 57 P.3d 1139. As stated, 
defendant meets that burden only if he can cite to "settled appellate law to guide the trial 
court." State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236,239 (Utah App. 1997). 
Here, defendant has failed to establish error, let alone obvious error. Specifically, 
defendant provides no legal authority to support his claim that evidence that a police 
officer met defendant on some prior unrelated occasion implies prior criminal conduct by 
defendant. Cf Fields v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 275,284 (Ky. 2000) (holding "fact 
that Officer Lindeman knew Appellant did not imply prior bad conduct"); People v. 
Embry, No. 220898,2000 WL 33388158 at *1 (Mich. App. Dec. 26,2000) (unpublished 
opinion) (holding "officer's statements that he was familiar with defendant... is not bad 
acts evidence"). 
Moreover, even if the officer's testimony were improper, defendant cannot show 
he was prejudiced by it. First, nothing in Minor's isolated testimony implied prior 
criminal conduct on defendant's part. See, e.g., State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d 1293, 1296-
97 (Utah App. 1997) (holding that, in considering prejudice from reference to defendant's 
right to silence, relevant factors include whether jury "would naturally and necessarily 
construe" comment as referring to silence and whether reference was isolated); State v. 
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Harmon, 956 P.2d 262,269 (Utah 1998). Second, given defendants' confession, the 
fingerprint and palm print evidence, and the blood on defendant's clothing, the evidence 
against him was compelling. See State v. Helmick, 2000 UT 70, ^  9, 9 P.3d 164 (holding 
admission of evidence, even if erroneous, was harmless where "there was overwhelming 
evidence of [defendant's] guilt"); State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925,931 (Utah App. 
1998). 
Consequently, defendant's claim fails. 
E. Defendant's claim that the prosecutor improperly shifted the 
burden of proof during rebuttal closing argument fails where the 
prosecutor's comments were proper rebuttal to defendant's 
closing argument. 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof during 
rebuttal closing argument when, on three different occasions, he commented on the lack 
of evidence supporting theories raised by defendant in his closing argument. Aplt. Br. at 
22-24. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
1. Proceedings below. 
In the State's closing argument, the prosecutor meticulously reviewed the evidence 
supporting defendant's guilt (R. 283:178-216). 
In response, defense counsel suggested that Sheldon Reeves, Tonya's neighbor, 
may have committed the murder. Specifically, defense counsel noted that Reeves was 
seen in the parking lot shortly after the murder, he had a questionable alibi, "there is some 
indication that there is something going on between Tonya and Sheldon," and Reeves' 
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physical size was consistent with the bloody clothes found under the truck (R. 283:219, 
223-24). 
Defense counsel also challenged evidence that defendant's palm print matched the 
photographed print found in the blood on Tonya's bedrail, arguing that "there were nine 
people that had access to that photograph for well over nine months," that the State 
"didn't call everybody, all nine people that had access to it, and say, did you tamper with 
it," and that "we can't prove it was tampered with, but they certainly didn't prove it 
wasn't tampered with" (R. 283:222-23). 
In rebuttal, the prosecutor first countered defendant's accusations concerning the 
palm print. 
. . . [Defense counsel] started talking about computerized 
palm prints. If they were computerized, they were done under the 
auspices of Russell Dean. You all saw Russ Dean Did you 
think you saw a person who would dummy up some prints? But 
there's no evidence. If they want to prove that you can dummy up 
prints—because Russ didn't know— 
(R. 283:228). Defense counsel objected that "[t]he State is now shifting the burden. 
They know we don't have to prove anything," (R. 283:228). The court sustained 
defendant's objection (R. 283:228). 
To defendant's argument concerning Sheldon Reeves, the prosecutor responded: 
Now, all of a sudden they've unearthed Sheldon Reeves as a 
reasonable likely—of a person who might have done this. First of 
all, they've offered no explanation as to how he managed to do any 
of the things that the defendant said he did— 
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(R. 283:230-31). Defense counsel again objected, arguing that "[t]he State is again 
saying we have . . . to offer an explanation" (R. 283:231). The trial court sustained 
counsel's objection and instructed the prosecutor that "[t]hey don't have to prove 
anything, Mr. [prosecutor]" (R. 283:231). The prosecutor then told the jury: 
What they forget to tell you is Ledford's testimony. They 
checked this out. Remember, those detectives were sent out to talk 
to other witnesses who had been away catfishing with Sheldon 
Reeves on that night and they verified his story 
This isn't just a matter of a person—he happened to walk by 
and, yeah, he was a friend of Tonya's. What's his motive. He's her 
friend. Why is he gonna kill her? There's no evidence for that. Yet 
they just raise a man who happens to walk by at that time. 
(R. 283:231). 
2. Defendant's claim fails where the prosecutor's comments 
were proper rebuttal. 
Claims of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument are considered in light of 
three general principles. First, "'[c]ounsel is afforded considerable latitude in closing 
argument to the jury and may fully recount the evidence adduced and the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom/" State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 804 (Utah App. 1998) 
(quoting State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475,478 (Utah 1989)). Second, "the prosecution has 
the duty to argue the case based on the total picture of the evidence or lack of evidence, 
including the paucity or absence of evidence adduced by the defense." State v. Bailey, 
712 P.2d 281,286 (Utah 1985) (citing State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43,46 (Utah 1984)). 
Third, the prosecutor "[is] entitled to rebut" arguments raised in defendant's closing 
argument even if that response includes a reference to defendant's failure to produce 
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evidence supporting the theories he raised in his closing. State v. Bowman, 945 P.2d 153, 
157 (Utah App. 1997). 
So long as the prosecutor adheres to these three principles, his remarks do "not 
have the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the defendant." Bailey, 712 P.2d at 286 
(holding prosecutor's comment, "Have we heard any testimony in this case that says that 
the analysis done by Officer Illsley on these fingerprints is incorrect?" was proper 
comment on the "paucity or absence of evidence adduced by the defense" to support his 
theory and does "not have the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the defendant"); 
Bowman, 945 P.2d at 157 (rejecting claim that prosecutor's rebuttal comment that if the 
State's failure to produce any particular witness "[is] such a big deal to [defendant], he 
has every opportunity to bring in everybody he wants" improperly shifted burden of proof 
where "[defendant opened the door to these comments by arguing at length in his 
closing argument to the jury that it should acquit the defendant based solely on the State's 
failure to produce . . . a key witness") (brackets in original). 
Here, all three of the prosecutor's remarks now challenged were in direct response 
to arguments made during defendant's closing argument. The first comment was in direct 
response to defendant's argument that the photo of the palm print on Tonya's bed rail 
could have been altered to match defendant's and that the State had produced no evidence 
to show that it was not so altered (R. 283:222-23,228). The second and third comments 
were in direct response to defendant's arguments that Sheldon Reeves could have 
perpetrated Tonya's murder (R. 283:219,223-24, 231). Under Bailey and Bowman, then, 
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the prosecutor's comments were proper rebuttal that did "not have the effect of shifting 
the burden of proof to the defendant." Bailey, 712 P.2d at 286. 
Even assuming the prosecutor's remarks were improper, defendant has not shown 
they were harmful. First, defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's first two remarks, 
the trial court sustained his objections, and after the second, the trial court told the 
prosecutor in front of the jury that defendant "do[esn't] have to prove anything" (R. 
283:231). Second, the trial court's jury instructions properly informed the jury on the 
burden of proof (R. 224: Jury Instr. 2: "[T]he defendant... is not obliged to introduce 
any evidence or to call any witnesses); R. 221: Jury Instr. 1; R. 232: Jury Instr. 9; R. 238: 
Jury Instr. 14; R. 251: Jury Instr. 26 (instructing that State "has the burden of proving 
each of the essential elements of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt")). "[Djefendant 
has not shown, as is his burden, that the [prosecutor's comments were] so prejudicial as to 
defeat the mitigating effect of the court's . . . curative instructions." State v. Kohl, 2000 
UT 35, % 24,999 P.2d 7; see also State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, Tl 40-41,994 P.2d 177 
(rejecting prosecutorial misconduct claim where comments "were not prejudicial as to 
defeat the mitigating effect of the trial court's curative instruction"). 
Finally, as previously stated, given defendant's confession, the fingerprint and 
palm print evidence, and the blood on defendant's clothing, the evidence against him was 
compelling. See State v. Helmick, 2000 UT 70,19, 9 P.3d 164 (holding admission of 
evidence, even if erroneous, was harmless where "there was overwhelming evidence of 
[defendant's] guilt"); State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 931 (Utah App. 1998). 
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Consequently, defendant's claim fails. 
F. Defendant's unpreserved claim that the prosecutor improperly 
referred to the trial court during rebuttal closing argument fails 
where he argues neither plain error nor exceptional 
circumstances on appeal. Alternatively, the claim fails because 
defendant provides no legal authority to support it. 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct during rebuttal 
closing argument when, commenting on defendant's reference to Jurassic Park in his 
closing argument, the prosecutor referred to the reasonable doubt jury instruction and told 
the jury, '"That is exactly what Judge Taylor doesn't want you considering when he says, 
reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason.'" Aplt. Br. at 25. 
This Court should refuse to reach defendant's claim because he did not object 
below and does not argue plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. 
Alternatively, because he provides no legal authority to support his claim, defendant has 
not established either error or obvious error under the plain error doctrine. 
1. Proceedings below. 
In his closing argument, defendant focused on the possibility that the photograph 
of the palm print found on Tonya's bed rail had been altered to match defendant's (R. 
283:222-23). In the course of that argument, defendant told the jury: 
And Russ Dean admitted that it might be possible to have 
made that picture on a computer. Now, I'm not a computer expert. I 
don't know if any of you are. But I think you've seen movies, seen 
commercials talking about what computers can do. You've [seen] 
movies like Jurassic Park. You've seen what they can do with a 
computer. Is it possible? I don't know if it's possible to duplicate 
that picture, but they didn't prove it didn't happen and they certainly 
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left the opportunity for it to happen by not securing it away where 
everybody in that office didn't have access to it. 
(R. 283:222-23). As part of his response in rebuttal, the prosecutor argued: 
He brought up whether a computerized thing could be done 
Read Rule 26, the reasonable doubt [instruction]. He says, who 
knows. Anything's possible with Jurassic Park. That is exactly what 
Judge Taylor doesn't want you considering when he says, by 
reasonable doubt is meant a doubt based on reason and which is 
reasonable in view of all the evidence. And now this is the important 
part: It is not based upon fanciful or wholly speculative possibility. 
That is what [defense counsel] is trying to say represents reasonable 
doubt, a fanciful and wholly speculative possibility. Jurassic Park. 
There is no evidence before you that this is even possible. 
(R. 283:229). 
2. This Court should not reach defendant's unpreserved 
claim where he does not argue either plain error or 
exceptional circumstances on appeal. 
As discussed above, before this Court will consider a claim on appeal, defendant 
must either have preserved that claim below or must argue that plain error or exceptional 
circumstances justifies review of the claim. See State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141,1144 
(Utah 1989); State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ffi[ 11,14,10 P.3d 346; see also State v. 
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995); State v. Jennings, 875 P.2d 566, 570 
(Utah App. 1994). 
Defendant did not raise this claim below. Moreover, he does not argue plain error 
or exceptional circumstances on appeal. See Aplt. Br. at 24-26. Consequently, this Court 
should decline to consider this claim. 
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3. Defendant's claim fails because he provides no legal 
authority to support a plain error claim. 
Even if this Court considers defendant's unpreserved claim, it is reviewable only 
for plain error. State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, % 13, 57 P.3d 1139. 
Here, defendant provides no legal authority to support his claim. Absent that 
authority, defendant cannot establish error, let alone obvious error. State v. Garcia, 2001 
UT App 19, H 6,18 P.3d 1123; State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236,239 (Utah App. 1997). 
Moreover, even if defendant could establish obvious error, he cannot establish 
prejudice. First, the prosecutor's comment was obviously a comment on how he thought 
the jury should apply a jury instruction to the evidence, not on how the judge personally 
viewed the evidence. Cf. State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d 1293,1296-97 (Utah App. 1997) 
(holding that, in considering prejudice from reference to defendant's right to silence, 
relevant factors include whether jury "would naturally and necessarily construe" 
comment as referring to silence and whether reference was isolated). 
Second, the jury was instructed that the trial court "do[es] not wish in any way to 
influence your verdict" and to "disregard anything I may have said or done if it made you 
think that I preferred one verdict over another, that I believed one witness over another, or 
that I considered any piece of evidence more important than another" (R. 245: Jury Instr. 
21). See State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35,H24, 999 P.2d 7 (holding defendant has burden to 
show that prosecutor's comments were "so prejudicial as to defeat the mitigating effect of 
the court's . . . curative instructions"). 
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Finally, defendant confessed to murdering Tonya (R. 281:110, 116-17). In 
addition, his fingerprint was found on the inside of her door, his palm print was found on 
her bloody bed rail, and his bloody clothes were found nearby (R. 281:110, 116-17; R. 
282:89,90,93, 94,184,200). Thus, the evidence against defendant was compelling. Cf 
State v. Helmick, 2000 Ut 70, \ 9,9 P.3d 164 (holding admission of evidence, even if 
erroneous, was harmless where "there was overwhelming evidence of [defendant's] 
guilt"); State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 931 (Utah App. 1998). 
Consequently, defendant's claim fails. 
II. DEFENDANT'S CONFRONTATION CLAUSE CLAIM FAILS 
WHERE HE AFFIRMATIVELY SANCTIONED THE ADMISSION 
OF THE STATEMENTS HE NOW CHALLENGES 
Defendant claims that his "constitutional right to confront witnesses was violated 
when the trial court allowed hearsay evidence on several important issues." Aplt. Br. at 
26. Defendant's claim fails because defense counsel affirmatively told the trial court that 
the statements now challenged were admissible. Alternatively, defendant's claim fails 
because statements not offered for the truth of the matters asserted do not trigger 
defendant's right to confrontation. 
A. Defendant's claim fails because he invited any error that occurred. 
Because defendant did not raise this claim below, it is reviewatble, if at all, only for 
plain error. State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348,113, 57 P.3d 1139. However, the plain 
error doctrine "is in no way implicated if defense counsel consciously elects to permit 
evidence to be admitted." State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989); State v. 
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Kingston, 2002 UT App 103, 1 22, 46 P.3d 761. "If the decision was conscious and did 
not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court should refuse to consider the 
merits of the trial court's ruling." Bullock, 791 P.2d at 159; State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 
343 (Utah 1997) ("If a party through counsel... has led the trial court into error, [this 
Court] will then decline to save that party from the error.") (citation omitted); State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1220 (Utah 1993). 
In this case, defense counsel affirmatively told the trial court during Officer 
Lucas's testimony that statements made to Lucas by other people were admissible 
because they were "not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted [but] simply to 
explain what Officer Lucas did and why he did it" (R. 281:15,223; R. 283:220). Thus, 
defendant "ied the trial court into [the] error" he now claims. Brown, 948 P.2d at 343. 
Moreover, defense counsel's decision was not ineffective assistance because it was 
strategically sound. Cf. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, J 19,12 P.3d 92 (holding that, 
to show ineffective assistance in counsel's failing to object, defendant must "rebut the 
strong presumption that' under the circumstances, the challenged action might be 
considered sound trial strategy'" (citation omitted)). First, the substance of most of the 
statements to which Lucas testified was proven either by defendant's own confession or 
other evidence produced at trial (R. 281:54-55, 75, 78, 83,111,152,195; R. 283:168). 
Second, the alternative to admitting such evidence was for the State to present a parade of 
witnesses who would have emphasized defendant's connection to Tonya's murder; by 
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allowing the witnesses' statements to come in through Officer Lucas's testimony not for 
the matters asserted, defense counsel was able to diffuse their testimony. 
Consequently, this Court should reject defendant's claim as invited error. 
B. Defendant's claim fails because statements not admitted for the 
truth of the matters asserted do not trigger defendant's right to 
confrontation. 
Even if this Court reaches defendant's claim, it fails on the merits. 
"The right of an accused to confront witnesses against him is a fundamental right 
guarded by both the federal and state constitutions." State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 
479 (Utah 1990). However, "'no Confrontation Clause issue is raised where the 
statements [challenged] are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted.99' United States 
v. Shannon, 137 F.3d 1112,1118 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Lujan, 936 F.2d 
406,410 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)); see also Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409,413 
(1985) (holding no confrontation issue where co-defendant's confession was not offered 
for truth of the matter asserted; distinguishing prior cases where "confrontation clause 
issues arose ... because hearsay evidence was admitted as substantive evidence against 
the defendants"); United States v. Watson, 952 F.2d 982,987 (8th Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Martin, 897 F.2d 1368,1372 (6th Cir. 1990). 
In this case, Officer Lucas relayed several out-of-court statements made to him that 
directed the course of his investigation (R. 281:14-15,17,19-20, 31-32,44-45,47, 54, 56, 
58, 61). However, as defense counsel himself informed the court, none of these 
statements were presented for the truth of the matters they asserted (R. 281:15, 223; R. 
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283:220). Thus, none of them implicated defendant's right to confrontation. Street, All 
U.S. at 413; Shannon, 137 F.3d at 1118; Watson, 952 F.2d at 987; Martin, 897 F.2d at 
1372. 
Consequently, defendant's claim fails. 
III. DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIMS FAIL 
WHERE HE HAS SHOWN NO HARMFUL ERRORS IN THE 
PROSECUTOR'S CONDUCT OR THE ADMISSION OF NON-
HEARSAY EVIDENCE, AND HE PROVIDES NO RECORD 
SUPPORT FOR HIS CLAIM THAT COUNSEL PROVIDED AN 
INADEQUATE DEFENSE 
Defendant claims that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective because he 
(1) "allowed the State to introduce the hearsay statements of several witnesses," (2) failed 
to object to "several inappropriate statements [made by the prosecutor] throughout the 
trial," and (3) "fail[ed] to establish a defense for the Defendant" because he "didn't 
produce Sheldon Reeves who was found in the victim's parking lot without a shirt shortly 
after the murder." Aplt. Br. at 35. None of defendant's claims have merit. 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show (1) "that 
counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment"; and (2) "that counsel's deficient performance was 
prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 
76, H 19,12 P.3d 92. "[Defendant bears the burden of assuring the record is adequate." 
Id. at If 16. "Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or 
deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that 
counsel performed effectively. Id. at f 17. 
33 
Concerning defendant's first two ineffective assistance of counsel claims, 
defendant relies on the arguments presented in Points I and II of his brief. See Aplt. Br. at 
35. However, as discussed above, in neither of those Points did defendant establish error, 
let alone prejudicial error. See pp. 8-33, supra. Thus, defendant's reference to those 
arguments is insufficient to establish either that his counsel performed deficiently in 
connection with those issues, or that counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial. 
Consequently, defendant's ineffective assistance claims based on those Points fail. 
Concerning the claim that his counsel was ineffective because he should have 
called Sheldon Reeves as a witness, defendant provides no record to support his claim. 
Specifically, defendant has provided no record "detailing what the testimony of [Reeves] 
would be or illustrating how that testimony would have helped him at trial." State v. 
Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1998). Without such a record, defendant cannot show that 
his counsel was ineffective in not calling Reeves as a defense witness. Id. 
Consequently, defendant's claims fails. 
34 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's 
conviction and sentence. 
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United States Const, amend. VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
Utah Const Art. I, § 12 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.1 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
